diff --git a/0149-helium-utility-and-emissions-realignment.md b/0149-helium-utility-and-emissions-realignment.md index efb6fdd74..a308a9bd3 100644 --- a/0149-helium-utility-and-emissions-realignment.md +++ b/0149-helium-utility-and-emissions-realignment.md @@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ reddit-post-id: 1twsn06 This HIP bundles four governance decisions, executed in a single program upgrade that ships once the Council is seated: -1. Mobile data deployers earn HNT based on the data they deliver, with a target minimum, in dollars, of half the per-GB offload price Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143]. The HNT that funds it is capped at HNT recently burned, so the target on its own does not grow net HNT supply. The Decision 2 supplement is separate, and it does raise the supply ceiling. +1. Mobile data deployers earn HNT based on the data they deliver, held within a band tied to the per-GB offload price Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143]: a target minimum, in dollars, of half that price, and a cap at twice it. The HNT that funds the minimum is capped at HNT recently burned, so the target on its own does not grow net HNT supply; earnings above the cap (when HNT appreciates faster than carrier revenue) are redirected to veHNT stakers and do not change supply. The Decision 2 supplement is separate, and it does raise the supply ceiling. 2. An operations and growth supplement: a per-epoch HNT mint into a Nova-administered Squads multisig vault for a flat-rate window followed by a multi-year linear taper. Total **~141M HNT over 36 months**, about 77% of current on-chain HNT supply (~182.5M), front-loaded (~50% in the first 12 months). Both windows are hardcoded at deploy and self-terminate. -3. Retirement of Proof-of-Coverage on both Mobile and IoT. Mobile data deployers earn pro-rata of rewardable bytes; the on-chain Service Provider allocation under [HIPs 82][hip-82]/[87][hip-87] is reframed as a flat Mobile Operations Fund. IoT data transfer continues at the existing $/DC peg. +3. Retirement of Proof-of-Coverage on both Mobile and IoT. Mobile data deployers earn pro-rata of rewardable bytes; the Service Provider allocation stays unchanged at 24%. IoT data transfer continues at the existing $/DC peg. 4. A 7-seat Advisory Council with standing oversight of how the operations and growth supplement is used, with the authority to escalate to a community termination vote. One veHNT vote approves all four decisions together. ## Motivation -The $0.50/GB target earn rate set in [HIP 53][hip-53] has compressed materially at the Hotspot. Over the past year, network rewardable bytes grew ~4× (from ~24K GB/day in June 2025 to ~97K GB/day in April 2026) while HNT issuance stayed fixed under the [HIP 20][hip-20] schedule and HNT price more than halved. +The $0.50/GB target earn rate set in [HIP 53][hip-53] has compressed at the Hotspot. Over the past year, network rewardable bytes grew ~4× (from ~24K GB/day in June 2025 to ~97K GB/day in April 2026) while HNT issuance stayed fixed under the [HIP 20][hip-20] schedule and HNT price more than halved. Three problems follow: @@ -37,20 +37,20 @@ This proposal ties deployer earnings to the payer rate Nova sets under [HIP 143] ## Stakeholders -- **Mobile data deployers.** Gain an immediate +20% uplift on baseline data rewards from the reallocation in Decision 3, plus a USD target minimum from Decision 1. +- **Mobile data deployers.** Gain two-sided participation from Decision 1: downside protection from the target minimum (binding at current HNT prices), and upside participation as HNT appreciates, since rewards are HNT-denominated, up to twice the payer rate. Above that the surplus is shared with stakers. The Decision 3 data bucket is unchanged at 70% (only PoC retires). - **IoT data deployers.** Unchanged on the income side ($/DC peg preserved); IoT PoC retires. -- **veHNT holders and delegators.** 6% delegator allocation preserved. Effective HNT max supply rises from ~206M (today's effective ceiling, after cumulative reductions since HIP 20) to ~347M to fund the supplement in Decision 2. +- **veHNT holders and delegators.** 6% delegator allocation preserved, plus any Mobile data earnings above the Decision 1 cap. Effective HNT max supply rises from ~206M (today's effective ceiling, after cumulative reductions since HIP 20) to ~347M to fund the supplement in Decision 2. - **Carriers and offload partners.** Continue under the existing [HIP 143][hip-143] commercial framework. The deployer target follows the payer rate. ## Detailed Explanation ### Decision 1: Revenue-linked emissions with a target minimum for Mobile deployers -What deployers get: a target minimum on earnings, in dollars per GB. Nova sets a per-GB offload price under [HIP 143][hip-143], the dollar amount the network charges carriers for each GB of data delivered. This decision aims to pay Mobile data deployers at least half that price per GB. When normal HNT emissions already pay more than the target, nothing changes; when they pay less, the protocol mints extra HNT that epoch to close the gap. +What deployers get: earnings that move with the network in both directions. Proof-of-Coverage is already retired by consensus; in its place, deployers earn from the data they deliver, tied to the per-GB offload price Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143] (the dollar amount the network charges carriers per GB). On the downside, a target minimum holds deployers at no less than half that price per GB: if HNT falls, the protocol mints extra HNT that epoch to keep them at the floor. On the upside, deployers share in HNT's appreciation, because rewards are paid pro-rata in HNT and their dollar value rises with the token, all the way up to twice the payer rate. The old $/DC peg gave neither; it paid a fixed dollar rate regardless of where HNT traded. Now that network metrics reveal the verifiable utility each deployment delivers, the deployments carrying real traffic share in the upside the token provides. Past twice the payer rate, where deployers would be earning more than double what carriers pay for the data, the surplus flows to veHNT stakers. Deployers, stakers, and the network each gain. Where the HNT comes from: the top-up is capped at the HNT recently burned, mostly Nova burning HNT to create the Data Credits carriers spend on offload. The protocol never mints more than was just burned, so this target on its own does not grow the net HNT supply. Decision 2's supplement is separate, and it does raise the supply ceiling. -The top-up is shared, not deployer-only: it is added to the epoch's total emissions and split across all reward pools by the usual percentages, the same as every other HNT emission. It is sized so Mobile data deployers land on the target after that split; the other pools (the Mobile Operations Fund, delegators, and the IoT sub-DAO) rise proportionally as a side effect. +The top-up is shared, not deployer-only: it is added to the epoch's total emissions and split across all reward pools by the usual percentages, the same as every other HNT emission. It is sized so Mobile data deployers reach the target after that split; the other pools (Service Provider Rewards, delegators, and the IoT sub-DAO) rise proportionally as a side effect. The target minimum is what the protocol aims to deliver, not a hard guarantee every epoch. After a sharp drop in the HNT price, the amount delivered can fall short for 1 to 2 weeks, until the burn average catches up. In normal conditions deployers receive the full target. @@ -60,35 +60,42 @@ The target minimum is what the protocol aims to deliver, not a hard guarantee ev | Condition | Outcome for Mobile data deployers | |---|---| -| Baseline ≥ half the payer rate (USD/GB) | Top-up = 0. Deployer earns baseline. | -| Baseline < half the payer rate | Total daily emissions increase, staying below the cap. Deployer earns half the payer rate in USD (target binds). | -| Baseline < half the payer rate, and the required increase exceeds recent burns | Total daily emissions increase, capped at `smoothed_hnt_burned`. Deployer earns below the target until the burn average catches up. | +| Baseline between half and twice the payer rate (USD/GB) | Top-up = 0, no redirect. Deployer earns baseline. | +| Baseline < half the payer rate | Total daily emissions increase, staying below the burn bound. Deployer earns half the payer rate in USD (target minimum binds). | +| Baseline < half the payer rate, and the required increase exceeds recent burns | Total daily emissions increase, bounded at `smoothed_hnt_burned`. Deployer earns below the target until the burn average catches up. | +| Baseline > twice the payer rate | Deployer earns twice the payer rate in USD (earnings cap binds); the excess HNT goes to veHNT stakers. Total daily emissions unchanged. | -The protocol computes the top-up each epoch from the published formula: +The protocol computes the top-up (floor) and the overflow (cap) each epoch from the published formula: ``` D_target = 0.5 × R_payer × bytes_GB / HNT_price -α = mobile_percent_share × 0.84 -top_up = min(smoothed_hnt_burned, max(0, (D_target − D_baseline) / α)) +D_cap = 2.0 × R_payer × bytes_GB / HNT_price +α = mobile_percent_share × 0.70 +top_up = min(smoothed_hnt_burned, max(0, (D_target − D_baseline) / α)) +staker_overflow = max(0, deployer_pool − D_cap) ``` -`R_payer` is the per-GB offload price Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143] (what the network charges carriers per GB); `bytes_GB` is rewardable bytes in the epoch (the GB that qualify for rewards); `HNT_price` is the HNT/USD price; `D_baseline = (HIP 20 schedule + Net Emissions re-emit) × α`; and `α` is the fraction of total HNT emission that reaches the Mobile data bucket. `mobile_percent_share` is the Mobile sub-DAO's on-chain percent share (a 30-epoch EMA of `mobile_vehnt / (mobile_vehnt + iot_vehnt)`, ~0.89 today, giving `α ≈ 0.75`), read from chain each epoch; it is not a parameter and floats with veHNT delegation, so the target binds under any Mobile/IoT split. +`R_payer` is the per-GB offload price Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143] (what the network charges carriers per GB); `bytes_GB` is rewardable bytes in the epoch (the GB that qualify for rewards); `HNT_price` is the HNT/USD price; `D_baseline = (HIP 20 schedule + Net Emissions re-emit) × α`; and `α` is the fraction of total HNT emission that reaches the Mobile data bucket. `mobile_percent_share` is the Mobile sub-DAO's on-chain percent share (a 30-epoch EMA of `mobile_vehnt / (mobile_vehnt + iot_vehnt)`, ~0.89 today, giving `α ≈ 0.625`), read from chain each epoch; it is not a parameter and floats with veHNT delegation, so the target binds under any Mobile/IoT split. -The division by `α` follows from the distribution described above: only `α` of the top-up lands at Mobile data deployers; the remaining `(1 − α)` flows to the Mobile Operations Fund, the delegator pool, and the IoT sub-DAO at their existing percent shares (see Decision 3). +The division by `α` follows from the distribution described above: only `α` of the top-up lands at Mobile data deployers; the remaining `(1 − α)` flows to Service Provider Rewards, the delegator pool, and the IoT sub-DAO at their existing percent shares (see Decision 3). + +The cap is simpler than the top-up. `deployer_pool` is the Mobile data bucket itself, so the overflow above `D_cap` is moved directly from that bucket to the delegator pool with no `α` division (the top-up needs the division only because it sizes a DAO-level mint that then splits across buckets). The overflow is neither minted nor burned: total emission that epoch is unchanged, and the HNT is paid to veHNT delegators (claimed DAO-wide pro-rata of total veHNT) instead of deployers, so the cap is net-supply-neutral. The floor and the cap never bind in the same epoch, since the floor sits at a quarter of the cap. On-chain, the redirect rides the existing reward fields: the Mobile sub-DAO's reward-issuance step mints the overflow to the delegator pool rather than the rewards escrow, and the verifier oracle sizes the Mobile data pool as the escrow remainder after the flat Operations Fund cut, so no new account or schema is required. The `min(smoothed_hnt_burned, …)` cap stops the top-up from emitting more HNT than has recently been burned. `smoothed_hnt_burned` is the existing HIP 20 variable: a 7-epoch moving average of HNT destroyed on-chain, mostly from Nova's burns to mint DC. Over any window, the top-up stays below total HNT destruction over the same window, so the top-up never adds to net supply. The top-up is distinct from and additive to the existing HIP 20 net-emissions re-emit, which is already counted in the baseline; combined, the two re-emission paths can exceed destruction by at most the net-emissions cap (~1,644 HNT/epoch), a pre-existing property unchanged by this proposal. The trade-off shows up during sharp HNT price moves: it takes Nova 1–2 weeks of burns at the new price for the moving average to catch up, and during that window the cap binds and delivery falls short of the full target. Once the average catches up, delivery returns to the full target. -Effective Mobile data deployer earn rate per GB = `max(baseline_$/GB, 0.5 × R_payer)`, subject to the burn-bounded cap. Two effects flow through to deployers without a follow-on vote: HNT/USD price increases raise the USD value of pro-rata baseline rewards; payer-rate increases under [HIP 143][hip-143] raise the target. +Effective Mobile data deployer earn rate per GB = `clamp(baseline_$/GB, 0.5 × R_payer, 2.0 × R_payer)`, the floor subject to the burn bound. Two effects flow through to deployers without a follow-on vote: HNT/USD price increases raise the USD value of pro-rata baseline rewards, up to the cap at twice the payer rate, above which the excess goes to stakers; payer-rate increases under [HIP 143][hip-143] raise both the floor and the cap. + +Before the vote, and separately from this proposal, Nova reduces the payer rate from $0.50/GB to ~$0.10/GB under [HIP 143][hip-143] (its existing authority), reflecting current commercial offload rates, with further adjustments permitted under Nova's commercial discretion. The floor and cap follow from that rate: $0.05/GB (50% × $0.10) and $0.20/GB (200% × $0.10). -Ahead of the vote on this proposal, Nova will reduce the payer rate from $0.50/GB to ~$0.10/GB under [HIP 143][hip-143]. The reduction reflects current commercial offload rates; [HIP 143][hip-143] is the existing authority for the rate setting and permits further adjustments under Nova's commercial discretion. The target sits at $0.05/GB (50% × $0.10 payer rate). At current delegations (`α ≈ 0.75`), the Mobile data deployer baseline (~16,640 HNT/day: HIP 20 schedule + Net Emissions re-emit pass-through, after Decision 3's +14pp reallocation) at ~91K GB/day rewardable volume falls below $0.05/GB in USD when HNT drops below ~$0.27. Above that threshold the top-up stays at zero; it activates under HNT downside or payer-rate uplift. +Where deployers land depends on the HNT price. At current delegations (`α ≈ 0.625`), ~91K GB/day rewardable volume, and the ~13,870 HNT/day Mobile data deployer baseline (HIP 20 schedule + Net Emissions re-emit pass-through, with the data bucket unchanged at 70%), the baseline equals the $0.05/GB floor near an HNT price of $0.33 and the $0.20/GB cap near $1.31. HNT trades below the floor threshold today (~$0.27), so the target minimum is already binding and is the protection that matters now; the cap is a guard against sustained appreciation, several times above the current price. The floor also activates under a payer-rate uplift; the cap also activates under a payer-rate cut. -The target share (50%) and the 84% Mobile data bucket are hardcoded; changing them requires a community HIP and program upgrade. +The target share (50%), the cap (200%), and the 70% Mobile data bucket are hardcoded; changing them requires a community HIP and program upgrade. IoT data transfer is unaffected by Decision 1 and continues on the existing $/DC peg. The IoT sub-DAO's existing percent share of any Mobile-driven top-up flows to the IoT Operations Fund (Decision 3). ### Decision 2: Operations and growth supplement -A per-epoch HNT mint into an operations and growth supplement vault (Nova-administered Squads multisig; recipient address fixed at the program upgrade), with two hardcoded boundary timestamps. Distinct from the on-chain Mobile Operations Fund in Decision 3 (which is a 10% slice of Mobile sub-DAO emission distributed on-chain); the supplement vault is a separate mint stream that does not flow through the sub-DAO allocation. +A per-epoch HNT mint into an operations and growth supplement vault (Nova-administered Squads multisig; recipient address fixed at the program upgrade), with two hardcoded boundary timestamps. Distinct from the on-chain Service Provider Rewards in Decision 3 (a flat 24% slice of Mobile sub-DAO emission distributed on-chain); the supplement vault is a separate mint stream that does not flow through the sub-DAO allocation. | Parameter | First window (flat) | Second window (taper) | |---|---|---| @@ -125,14 +132,14 @@ Removal of Proof-of-Coverage mechanisms from the Mobile and IoT verifier oracles | Bucket | Today | Under this proposal | |---|---|---| -| Data deployers | ~70%, pro-rata in practice | **84%**, pro-rata of rewardable bytes | -| SP / Operations Fund | up to 24% ([HIP 87][hip-87] data-proportional, capped by [HIP 82][hip-82] plan-price formula) | **10%** flat, Mobile Operations Fund (reuses the SP NFT/entity as bucket holder) | +| Data deployers | ~70%, pro-rata in practice | **70%**, pro-rata of rewardable bytes (unchanged) | +| Service Provider Rewards | 24% flat | **24% (unchanged)** | | veHNT delegators | 6% | 6% (unchanged) | | PoC bucket | residual under [HIP 147][hip-147] | **0** (retired) | -The Mobile data pool grows from 70% to 84% of sub-DAO emission (+14pp), a ~+20% per-Hotspot uplift on baseline data rewards (84/70 = 1.20). +PoC retirement is the only Mobile allocation change: the data bucket stays at 70% and Service Provider Rewards stay at 24%. The deployer value comes from Decision 1's target minimum and earnings cap, which at current HNT prices is the binding support. -The on-chain SP role under [HIPs 82][hip-82] and [87][hip-87] ends; the SP NFT/entity is reused as the bucket holder for the flat 10% Mobile Operations Fund. Future carriers onboard as offload carriers under the existing [HIP 143][hip-143] framework, not as on-chain SPs. +The Service Provider Rewards bucket is unchanged: a flat 24% to Nova Labs, the single registered Service Provider. Future carriers onboard as offload carriers under the existing [HIP 143][hip-143] framework, not as on-chain SPs. **IoT sub-DAO changes:** @@ -141,7 +148,7 @@ The on-chain SP role under [HIPs 82][hip-82] and [87][hip-87] ends; the SP NFT/e - IoT Operations Fund absorbs the former PoC bucket and data-bucket underflow. - The IoT sub-DAO's existing percent share of any Mobile-driven top-up (Decision 1) also flows to the IoT Operations Fund. IoT data deployers are already paid at peg from baseline; this share is not split with them. -**Top-up flow.** Decision 1's top-up distributes via the standard sub-DAO allocation. At the current ~89/11 Mobile/IoT veHNT split, ~75% reaches Mobile data deployers (the targeted uplift); the remaining ~25% routes to the Mobile Operations Fund (~9%), the delegator pool (~6%), and the IoT sub-DAO (~10%) at their existing percent shares. These shares move with veHNT delegation. The IoT sub-DAO's portion flows to the IoT Operations Fund. +**Top-up flow.** Decision 1's top-up distributes via the standard sub-DAO allocation. At the current ~89/11 Mobile/IoT veHNT split, ~62% reaches Mobile data deployers (the targeted uplift); the remaining ~38% routes to Service Provider Rewards (~21%), the delegator pool (~6%), and the IoT sub-DAO (~10%) at their existing percent shares. These shares move with veHNT delegation. The IoT sub-DAO's portion flows to the IoT Operations Fund. ### Decision 4: Advisory Council @@ -185,7 +192,7 @@ This is the Council's built-in escalation mechanism, not a limit on normal gover |---|---|---| | **Pre-vote payer-rate change** | pre-passage | Nova reduces the payer rate from $0.50/GB to ~$0.10/GB under [HIP 143][hip-143] (existing authority; no governance vote required), reflecting current commercial offload rates. | | **Passage** | pre-M0 | Bundle approved at the 66.67% supermajority. Council nomination opens. | -| **Council seated** | M0 | Per-nominee community confirmation concludes; all seven seats filled, disclosure obligations and escalation pathway operational. Program upgrade ships: the target-minimum formula (live but dormant at deploy conditions), PoC retirement in Mobile and IoT verifier oracles, Mobile data reallocation to 84% pro-rata, SP allocation reframed to the 10% Mobile Operations Fund. Supplement mint configured but not yet active. | +| **Council seated** | M0 | Per-nominee community confirmation concludes; all seven seats filled, disclosure obligations and escalation pathway operational. Program upgrade ships: the target-minimum formula (live; binding at current HNT prices near $0.27), PoC retirement in Mobile and IoT verifier oracles, Mobile data rewards move to 70% pro-rata (unchanged bucket), Service Provider Rewards unchanged at 24%. Supplement mint configured but not yet active. | | **Mint start** | M0 + 2 weeks | First-window supplement begins minting into the vault. The two-week gap lets the seated Council review materials and, if it objects, escalate a community vote to terminate or amend the supplement before minting starts; a termination here prevents the first window from beginning. Its standing escalation power continues throughout both windows. | | **Flat boundary** | ≈ mint start + 12 months (hardcoded) | First-window supplement auto-transitions to the tapering window. | | **Taper boundary** | ≈ mint start + 36 months (hardcoded) | Tapering supplement reaches zero and halts. | @@ -210,15 +217,17 @@ This is the Council's built-in escalation mechanism, not a limit on normal gover ## Drawbacks - **Dilution.** The supplement in Decision 2 raises effective max HNT supply from ~206M (today's effective ceiling, after cumulative reductions since HIP 20's 2020 projection) to ~347M. The accrual is bounded at deploy and self-terminating. -- **Bundling.** Voters cannot accept some decisions and reject others. The decisions are operationally coupled (the Council oversees the supplement; the target relies on the same program upgrade as the reallocation), but a voter who supports three of four still has to vote on the bundle. +- **Bundling.** Voters cannot accept some decisions and reject others. The decisions are operationally coupled (the Council oversees the supplement; the target relies on the same program upgrade as PoC retirement), but a voter who supports three of four still has to vote on the bundle. - **PoC removal ends a reward category.** Some deployments that brought network value primarily through PoC may not be sustained on data utility alone. The proposal accepts this trade in exchange for routing rewards to verifiable utility. - **Dependence on the payer-rate setting.** The deployer target depends on the payer rate Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143]. Council insight rights cover this setting, but the authority remains with Nova as in [HIP 143][hip-143]. -- **Delivery dips briefly after sharp HNT moves.** The top-up is capped at `smoothed_hnt_burned` so it can't emit more HNT than has been burned recently. After a sharp HNT crash, deployers get partial delivery for 1–2 weeks until Nova's burns at the new price lift the moving average; delivery returns to the full target after. The same cap is what prevents unbounded minting under crash. +- **Delivery dips briefly after sharp HNT moves.** The top-up is bounded by `smoothed_hnt_burned` so it can't emit more HNT than has been burned recently. After a sharp HNT crash, deployers get partial delivery for 1–2 weeks until Nova's burns at the new price lift the moving average; delivery returns to the full target after. The same bound is what prevents unbounded minting under crash. ## Rationale and Alternatives **Why a target tied to the payer rate rather than a fixed $/GB.** A fixed $/GB number goes stale as HNT price and offload economics change; the original $0.50/GB target no longer reflects actual deployer earnings. Tying the target to the payer rate Nova sets under [HIP 143][hip-143] makes deployer earnings track the revenue the network actually generates and routes future payer-rate improvements directly to deployers. +**Why cap deployer earnings at twice the payer rate, and route the excess to stakers.** Because the baseline pool is fixed in HNT and distributed pro-rata, its USD value rises without limit as HNT appreciates, so deployers could earn many multiples of what carriers pay the network for the same GB. The cap bounds that: deployer USD pay can't run more than 2× ahead of revenue. The 4× band ($0.05 to $0.20/GB at the current payer rate) leaves deployers full exposure to HNT appreciation through normal ranges and engages only on sustained appreciation. The excess is redirected to veHNT stakers rather than burned: it gives lockers a revenue-linked upside that activates exactly when deployer pay outruns revenue, and keeps the cap net-supply-neutral. Burning instead would tighten supply but return nothing to participants; redirecting concentrates the benefit on the holders who lock to govern. + **Why pro-rata of rewardable bytes for Mobile data.** Pro-rata is splitting-resistant by construction: subdividing a busy site doesn't change total rewards earned from its traffic. Tiered-DAU and per-Hotspot caps were modeled and rejected because they reward subdivision. **Why retire PoC rather than reduce it further.** [HIP 147][hip-147] already implemented "data eats first" in Sept 2025. With most viable Mobile deployments now reaching carrier offload within weeks, the residual PoC bucket pays for existing rather than for utility. Retiring it is preferable to maintaining a verifier code path that produces near-zero rewards. @@ -241,13 +250,12 @@ This is the Council's built-in escalation mechanism, not a limit on normal gover The on-chain changes ship in a single program upgrade once the Council is seated. Verifier oracle changes for PoC retirement (Mobile and IoT) are coordinated with that upgrade. We leave the implementation of the program upgrade and verifier oracle changes up to the Helium Core Developers to determine. -This proposal is not backwards compatible in the sense that PoC reward emissions stop when the program upgrade ships (at Council seating). Hotspots earning predominantly through PoC today will see their rewards drop to zero from the PoC bucket and depend on data utility. The +20% Mobile data reallocation and the target minimum are the offsetting mechanisms for Mobile; IoT continues at the existing $/DC peg. +This proposal is not backwards compatible in the sense that PoC reward emissions stop when the program upgrade ships (at Council seating). Hotspots earning predominantly through PoC today will see their rewards drop to zero from the PoC bucket and depend on data utility. The target minimum and earnings cap are the offsetting mechanisms for Mobile (the data bucket is unchanged at 70%); IoT continues at the existing $/DC peg. HIPs retired by Mobile PoC removal: [74][hip-74], [75][hip-75], [85][hip-85], [105][hip-105], [113][hip-113], [119][hip-119], [131][hip-131], [133][hip-133], [135][hip-135], [147][hip-147]. HIPs retired by IoT PoC removal: [15][hip-15], [17][hip-17], [54][hip-54], [58][hip-58], [83][hip-83], [136][hip-136], [137][hip-137]. -HIPs retired under the SP allocation reframe: [82][hip-82] and [87][hip-87]. HIPs partially amended: [10][hip-10] (Mobile $/DC peg replaced by pro-rata of rewardable bytes plus the target minimum; IoT $/DC peg preserved), [53][hip-53] ($0.50/GB Mobile target superseded by Decision 1's target minimum; Mobile sub-DAO structure preserved), [93][hip-93].